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THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S NOVEL
APPROACH TO DEFINING DEBT UNDER
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: IN re
ROBINSON
Bankruptcy proceedings are governed exclusively by federal
law' under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19782 as modified by the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (the
"Code").3 The Code allows an individual to be relieved from all
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Congress is authorized "to establish... uniform Laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." Id. Federal bankruptcy law
was governed by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541 section 6, 30 Stat. 544 [hereinafter
referred to as the "Act"] for nearly 80 years without any large-scale revision. See Country-
man, A History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81 COM. L.J. 226, 231 (1976). In 1970, believ-
ing that the Act no longer adequately or realistically addressed serious bankruptcy issues,
Congress established the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States (the
"Commission") to "study, analyze, evaluate and recommend changes" in the system of
bankruptcy administration. See J. TROST, G. TREISTER, R. FORMAN, K. KLEE & A. LEVIN, THE
NEW FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY CODE (1979) [hereinafter cited as TROST].
The Commission's report, submitted to Congress in 1973, consisted of its findings of
weaknesses in the bankruptcy system, recommended solutions, and the proposed text for
the new Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 3. See H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., (1973),
reprinted in 3 W. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, App. 2 § 3 pt. 1 (15th ed. 1983) [hereinafter
cited as Commission Report]. The Commission articulated three goals of bankruptcy policy:
(1) equality of distribution among creditors; (2) a "fresh start" for debtors, and (3) economi-
cal administration. Commission Report, supra, at 75. The Commission viewed the policy of
giving the debtor a "fresh start" as a particularly important goal and stated that access to
the bankruptcy process should not be "effectively denied" by non-legal circumstances. Id. at
76.
The Commission recommendations, combined with input from the National Conference
of Bankruptcy Judges and Congress, produced the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Pub. L.
95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978); see TROST, supra, at 17; H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787. See generally Pickard, The New
Bankruptcy Code, Part I: A Review of Some of the Significant Changes in Bankruptcy
Law, 10 MEMPHIS ST. U.L. REV. 177 (1980); Kennedy, Foreward: A Brief History of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C.L. REV. 667 (1980). Provisions in Title I of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act containing the substantive law of bankruptcy in liquidation and reorganization
cases were amended by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.
Pub. L. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333. See generally Norton & Lieb, Jurisdiction and Procedure
Under the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 1985 ANN. SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 50,
(1985). This Comment focuses on the provisions for individual bankruptcy contained in
chapter seven of Title I. See generally B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MAN-
UAL 1.01-1.15 (rev. ed. 1986) (general discussion of chapter 7 liquidation).
2 Pub. L. 95-598, 92 stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. (1982)).
Pub. L. 98-353, 98 stat. 333 (1984).
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dischargeable debts4 in existence at the date relief is sought.5 Cer-
tain debts, however, are excepted from discharge and therefore
survive the bankruptcy proceeding.6 The Code is silent as to the
4 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1982). The Code defines debt as "liability on a claim." Id. The
term "claim" is further defined as:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liqui-
dated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed,
legal, equitable, secured or unsecured; or (B) right to an equitable remedy for
breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or
not such right ... is reduced to judgment ....
11 U.S.C § 101(4) (1982). By defining "debt" and "claim" broadly, Congress abandoned the
"provability" concept of claims so that the bankruptcy proceeding could deal with all poten-
tial financial obligations of the debtor and preserve one of the goals of the system: a "fresh
start" for the debtor. See H.R. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 309, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6266; see also Matthews, The Scope of Claims Under the
Bankruptcy Code, (First Installment) 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 229 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Matthews, First Installment] (Code defined "claim" broadly to make difficulties in esti-
mation irrelevant, avoiding problems with prior provability concept's exclusion of significant
debts from bankruptcy proceedings); Norton, Analysis of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, 1979 ANN. SURVEY OF BANKR. LAW 198, 200 (1979) (breadth of claim definition in-
tended to provide broadest possible relief to debtor). Courts construing the term "claim"
have generally interpreted it quite broadly to effectuate the intent of Congress. See Ohio v.
Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. 705, 709 (1985) (Congress desired broad definition of claim); In re M.
Frenville Co., Inc., 744 F.2d 332, 336 (3d Cir. 1984) (Congress intended definition of claim to
be very broad), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 911 (1985); In re Vasu Fabrics, Inc., 39 Bankr. 513,
517 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1984) (broader term claim replaced provability concept to include
claims not fixed as to liability on date of filing in bankruptcy). Nonetheless, the breadth of
the "claim" definition was not designed to affect all legal relationships or duties owed by the
debtor. For example, as a key legislator stated: "rights to an equitable remedy.., which
[do] not give rise to a right to payment are not 'claims' and would therefore not be suscepti-
ble to discharge in bankruptcy." (emphasis added) See 124 CONG. REC. 32,393 (1978) (state-
ment of Rep. Don Edwards); see also In re Mandalay Shores Coop. Hous. Ass'n, 54 Bankr.
632, 635-36 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984) ("if, under local law, party whose claim is challenged is
not entitled to relief against debtor, then no claim exists despite extremely broad definition
of Code").
Discharge of debt within the meaning of the Code through chapter 7 liquidation pro-
ceedings is available only to individuals. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1982).
11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1982).
6 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982). Congress has determined on public policy grounds that
certain debts should not be dischargeable in bankruptcy. See generally Cohen & Klee, Ca-
veat Creditor: The Consumer Debtor Under the Bankruptcy Code, 58 N.C.L. REV. 681
(1980). Consequently, § 523(a) provides in relevant part:
A discharge under section 727 ... does not discharge an individual debtor from
any debt... (2) for obtaining money, property, services, or an extension, renewal
or refinance of credit, . . by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual
fraud... (4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embez-
zlement, or larceny; . . . (6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to an-
other entity or to the property of another entity; (7) to the extent such debt is for
a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit,
and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss ....
11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982). Under subsections 2, 4 and 6 the
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dischargeability of criminal restitution obligations imposed by a
state court pursuant to its police power,7 and federal courts called
upon to decide this issue have disagreed as to whether such obliga-
tions are debts that are excepted from discharge,8 or are even
debts at all.' Recently, in In re Robinson, ° the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the definition of
debt under the Code is sufficiently broad to include criminal resti-
tution obligations, and that such debts are dischargeable in
bankruptcy."
In Robinson, the plaintiff (Robinson) had been convicted by
the Connecticut Superior Court of larceny for unlawfully receiving
public assistance benefits from the Connecticut Department of In-
burden is on the creditor holding the debt to litigate the issue of non-dischargeability. Id. at
§ 523(c) (1982); see S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 80, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5865-66. The creditor must request, in a timely fashion, that the
court determine the non-dischargeability of the debt or it will be discharged. See 3 COLLIER,
supra note 1, § 523.13 at 523-72. The remaining subsections, including 7, list debts that are
non-dischargeable irrespective of whether or not the creditor objects. See, e.g., Gonzales v.
Aetna Fin. Co., 86 Nev. 271, 273, 468 P.2d 15, 17 (1970) (creditor who does not object to
discharge during bankruptcy proceedings may subsequently claim debt was non-dischargea-
ble); Household Fin. Corp. v. Hamer, 248 M.D. 567, 569, 238 A.2d 112-14, (1968) (creditor
does not have to participate in bankruptcy proceeding to protect rights when debt is non-
dischargeable).
7 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1982). See generally Rendleman, The Bankruptcy Discharge: To-
ward a Fresher Start, 58 N.C. L. REv. 723 (1980).
1 See, e.g., In re Cornell, 44 Bankr. 528, 530 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985) (restitution obliga-
tion arising as condition of probationary sentence not debt but penalty imposed by state to
enforce criminal statutes, therefore excepted from discharge); In re Cox, 33 Bankr. 657, 661
(Bankr. M.D.Ga. 1983) (obligation imposed as penalty is non-dischargeable in bankruptcy).
I See, e.g., In re Oslager, 46 Bankr. 58, 61-62 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1985) (restitution not
debt within meaning of Code even when payment ordered directly to welfare agency); In re
Vik, 45 Bankr. 64, 67 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) (great weight of authority mandates finding
that pre-petition restitution order is not "debt" within meaning of Code); In re Pellegrino,
42 Bankr. 129, 132 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (because victim cannot enforce court's order and
state can only issue warrant to revoke probation, restitution order is not debt within con-
templation of Code); In re Magnifico, 21 Bankr. 800, 803 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982) (restitution
imposed as condition of probation not debt contemplated by Code, purpose not debt-servic-
ing but rehabilitation); In re Button, 8 Bankr. 692, 694 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981) (no debtor/
creditor relationship or right to payment, no congressional intent in any section of Code to
relieve debtor's of criminal responsibilities); People v. Washburn, 97 Cal. App. 3d 621, 625,
158 Cal. Rptr. 822, 825 (1979) (Code does not envision that its provisions would apply to or
discharge court ordered restitution obligations). But see In re Brown, 39 Bankr. 820, 823
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (restitution order is dischargeable debt, Congress failed to insert
appropriate language to keep restitution obligations outside the realm of debt for bank-
ruptcy purposes); see also supra note 4 (discussing concept of debt within Code).
-0 776 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1181 (1986).
" See 776 F.2d at 41.
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come Maintenance ("CDIM").12 The Connecticut court suspended
execution of the sentence and placed Robinson on probation for
five years on the condition that she make restitution to CDIM.
13
Restitution payments were to be made to the Connecticut Office of
Adult Probation ("COAP").'4 Shortly after sentencing, Robinson
filed a chapter seven petition in the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Connecticut declaring bankruptcy and in-
cluded the restitution obligation as a scheduled debt.1 Notice of
the proceeding was served on both CDIM and COAP, neither of
which appeared to file a proof of claim or an objection to the pend-
ing discharge of the restitution obligation.' Subsequently, the
bankruptcy court entered an order discharging Robinson from all
"dischargeable debts." 7
Three years later, COAP informed Robinson that because it
did not recognize the restitution obligation as a debt dischargeable
in bankruptcy, it did not recognize the discharge order.'8 Conse-
quently, COAP advised Robinson that it intended to "enforce the
[sentencing] court's order to the fullest extent possible."'19 In re-
sponse, Robinson moved under the Bankruptcy Code for injunctive
relief to prevent COAP and CDIM from seeking to enforce pay-
ment of the restitution obligation or to report a violation of proba-
tion.20 The bankruptcy court denied all relief sought by the plain-
tiff, holding that the restitution obligation was not a "debt" within
the meaning of the Code because CDIM, as victim, had no right
2 See id. at 31-32. Robinson was found to have wrongfully received $9,932.95 in welfare
benefits while simultaneously receiving social security benefits. Id.
,3 See id. at 32.
" See id.
15 See id. Robinson began making monthly payments to COAP on January 16, 1981. Id.
On February 5, she filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy under chapter 7. Id. She contin-
ued, however, to make payments to COAP until May, 1981. Id.
"I See id. April 27 was the last day for the filing of objections to discharge or com-
plaints to determine the dischargeability of any debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(c). Id.
17 See id. On May 14, 1981 the bankruptcy court issued the Discharge Order. Id.
18 See id.
'9 Appendix at 60, In re Robinson, 776 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct.
1181 (1986). See infra notes 42 and 43.
20 See 776 F.2d at 32. The Code provides that a discharge "operates as an injunction
against the commencement or continuation of an action, to collect,. . . any such debt as a
personal liability of the debtor. . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1982). The Code also prohibits a
governmental unit from discriminating against debtors or revoking a grant "solely because
such bankrupt or debtor. . . has not paid a debt that is dischargeable . . ." Id. at § 525
(1982). Robinson, therefore, also sought to prevent officials from revoking or reporting a
violation of probation. See 776 F.2d at 32.
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under state law to enforce the restitution payment.2 The bank-
ruptcy court's order was affirmed by the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut.=
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed. 3 Writing for the
court, Judge Kearse determined that the statutory scheme defining
"debt" as "liability on a claim '24 was intended by Congress to in-
clude virtually any obligation to pay money.25 The court asserted
that the legislative history of the Code revealed Congress' intent to
seek the "broadest possible definition of a claim. '26 Thus, the court
held that if an entity had a right to receive payment of a restitu-
tion obligation, the obligor owed a debt within the meaning of the
Code.
Judge Kearse reasoned that COAP had a "right to payment"
even if CDIM did not, because COAP had the obligation to enforce
the terms of Robinson's probation .2  The court did not view as rel-
evant the fact that COAP's "right to payment" lay only in the
threat of revocation of probation rather than in a levy and execu-
tion on the debtor's property. 29
The Second Circuit in Robinson purported to effectuate the
true intent of Congress in holding that a restitution order imposed
by a criminal court is a debt under bankruptcy law. It is submit-
ted, however, that in so holding, the Robinson court failed to ana-
lyze properly the crucial right to payment element of a claim in
2 In re Robinson, 45 Bankr. 423, 424 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) The bankruptcy court
held that the restitution obligation was not a debt, and even assuming arguendo that it was,
such a debt was a penalty excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(7). Id. at 424-25;
see, infra notes 29 and 30.
22 See Robinson, 776 F.2d at 33.
23 See id.
21 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1982). See also supra note 4 (statutory definition of a
"claim").
" See Robinson, 776 F.2d at 36.
2 Id. at 34.
See id. at 36.
See id. at 38.
'9 See id. Once the Second Circuit concluded that the restitution obligation was a debt,
the court analyzed whether the debt was excepted from discharge under § 523(a) of the
Code. Id. at 39-41; see supra note 6 (provisions of § 523(a)). The court was precluded from
analyzing the non-dischargeability issue under § 523(a)(2) and (4) since neither COAP nor
CDIM had sought a hearing as required under those sections. See Robinson, 776 F.2d at 39;
supra note 6. The court thus considered the issue under § 523(a)(7) and concluded that the
restitution obligation that was imposed was set at precisely the amount that Robinson had
wrongfully received from CDIM. Robinson, 776 F.2d at 40. Hence, the debt could not be
considered as one that is "not compensation for actual pecuniary loss" as required under §
523(a)(7) and could not be excepted from discharge. Id. at 40-41.
[Vol. 60:344
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bankruptcy. This Comment will show that once civil judgments are
distinguished from the criminal conviction at issue in Robinson, it
is clear that COAP had no right to payment and that as a result,
the restitution obligation was not a debt that could be discharged
in bankruptcy. In addition, it will be shown that only this ap-
proach comports with congressional intent while retaining the via-
bility of restitutionary probation as a sentencing alternative for
state courts.
THE RIGHT TO PAYMENT IN BANKRUPTCY
As the Robinson court observed, a majority of the courts con-
sidering the issue of criminal restitution obligations within the
meaning of the Bankruptcy Code have concluded that they are not
debts.30 These courts have held that a restitution obligation is not
a debt because the victim has no right to payment.3 1 Although the
Second Circuit asserted that COAP had a "right to payment",32
30 See 776 F.2d at 34; supra note 4 (discussing concept of debt within meaning of
Code). The applicability of Chapter 7 in general and § 523 in particular depends on whether
the restitution obligation is a debt at all. See Robinson 776 F.2d at 33. This Comment con-
cludes that such an obligation is not encompassed within the Code's "debt" definition be-
cause it fails the "right to payment" test. See infra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
Consequently, it is suggested that an analysis of the dischargeability sections contained in §
523 is unnecessary because the restitution obligation is not a debt.
"' See, In re Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. 129, 132 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984). The majority of
courts holding that a restitutionary obligation is not a debt under the Code have accepted
the reasoning enunciated in Pellegrino. Robinson, 776 F.2d at 34; supra note 9. In Pelle-
grino, the debtor, convicted of larceny and sentenced to a prison term, was given five years
probation on the condition that he make restitution. Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. at 131. The
debtor filed for bankruptcy, listing the victim and state probation department as unsecured
creditors. Id. The Bankruptcy Court determined that under state law a victim could not
enforce a court's order of restitution if the offender failed to make payments. Id. at 132. The
state's sole remedy in enforcing its criminal sanctions was to cite the defendant for violation
of probation and, after a hearing, to revoke probation. Id. The court held that since no
enforecable right to payment existed, the restitution obligation was not a debt within the
meaning of the Code. Id. But see In re Newton, 15 Bankr. 708, 710 (Bankr. N.D.Ga. 1981)
(state law allows enforcement of criminal restitution order as civil judgment by execution,
thus restitution obligation is debt within meaning of Code).
The Pellegrino Court acknowledged that the Code provision defining debt did not spe-
cifically except obligations arising out of state criminal proceedings. Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. at
134. The court, examining the statutory scheme as a whole and the legislative history, how-
ever, denoted the purpose of the Code as offering debtors relief from financial over-exten-
sion but not a safe haven from criminal proceedings. Id. Thus the court concluded, "it
would defy both logic and reason to allow a convicted person, who has been ordered to make
restitution ... in lieu of incarceration, to use the Bankruptcy Code to escape the conse-
quences of his crime." Id.
3' Robinson, 776 F.2d at 38.
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the court failed to support its expansive reading of that term with
any reference to legislative history or decisional authority.33 The
court's definition of the "right to payment" encompasses virtually
any legal right held in relation to the debtor.3 1 It is suggested that
such an overly broad reading runs contrary to the intent of Con-
gress3 5 and that a proper analysis of the legislative history and de-
cisional authority defining the "right to payment" will show that
13 See id. Addressing COAP's "right to payment", the Second Circuit observed:
Plainly ... COAP has the right to receive payment from Robinson and the power
to seek enforcement of its rights. . . . Nor is it relevant that the right is enforcea-
ble by the threat of revocation of probation and incarceration rather than by the
threat of levy and execution on the debter's property. The right is not the less
cognizable because the obligor must suffer loss of freedom rather than loss of
property upon failure to pay.
Id.
I 3 See id. The Robinson Court accepted the general principles enunciated in In re
Browne, 39 Bankr. 820 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984), see Robinson, 776 F.2d at 35, in which a
bankruptcy ccurt held that a restitution order imposed by a criminal court "no less ac-
knowledges the existence of a debt than an order of a civil court reducing that claim to
judgment." Browne, 39 Bankr. at 822. It is suggested that this analysis fails to realize the
fundamental distinction between civil judgments and criminal convictions, see, e.g., State v.
Dillon, 292 Or. 172, 175, 637 P.2d 602, 606 (1981) (restitution is not form of civil liability
and recovery, theory is penological); State v. Harris, 70 N.J. 586, 597-98, 362 A.2d 32, 38
(1976) (criminal restitution obligation not "damages" in sense of civil liability); State v.
Scherr, 9 Wis. 2d 418, 425, 101 N.W.2d 77, 81 (1960) (restitution as condition of probation is
criminal not civil liability); see also, Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A
Procedural Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REV. 931, 937 (1984) (though restitution appears to share
civil law aim of compensation, its principal value is as corrective device); Comment, Power
of Court to Impose Particular Kinds of Punishment, 59 N.D. L.REv. 495, 500 (1985) (resti-
tution not intended to be equivalent of civil award of damages); and thus fails to ascertain
the lack of a true debtor/creditor relationship between Robinson and COAP. See infra note
43.
,5 The intent of Congress with regard to criminals and the Bankruptcy Code can be
gleaned from an examination of § 362(b)(4). In establishing exceptions to the automatic stay
contained in section 362 the legislative history reveals, "[wihere a governmental unit is su-
ing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud .... or similar police or regulatory laws, or
attempting to fix damages for violation of such law, the action or proceeding is not stayed
under the automatic stay."
H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5963, 6299; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1982).
According to the Second Circuit, however, the failure of Congress to discuss in detail,
how Code provisions impact on criminal offenders means that Congress did not intend to
exclude criminal offenders from utilizing the bankruptcy system. See Robinson, 776 F.2d at
37-38. It is submitted that such a reading is too narrow and inevitably frustrates the intent
of Congress in implementing the overall statutory scheme. See In re Hansen, 48 Bankr. 107,
110 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1985) (Congress did not intend to relieve criminals of restitution
obligations imposed as condition of probation); In re C.H. Stuart, Inc., 12 Bankr. 85, 86
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981) (thief cannot escape criminal sanctions by filing bankruptcy and
listing victim as creditor); In re McMinn, 4 Bankr. 150, 154 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980) (general
proposition Bankruptcy Code should not be haven for criminal offenders).
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the right should be interpreted as the right to enforce a money
judgment.
A right to payment does not exist if "a damage award would
not be available even if one could prove the extent of damages with
reasonable certainty."36 The existence of a "right to payment" is
determined by the law governing the transaction between the
debtor and the "claimant. 3 7 In assessing whether a "right to pay-
ment" exists, the court focuses on whether in a non-bankruptcy
context an entity has an enforceable right to sue for a money judg-
ment against the individual's existing assets.38
CDIM had a potential civil claim which, though not reduced
to judgment, was discharged by order of the bankruptcy court.3 9
11 Matthews, The Scope of Claims Under the Bankruptcy Code (Second Installment),
57 Am. BANKE. L.J. 339, 353 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Matthews, Second Installment]; see
Chatz, Costello, Gross, An Overview of the Bankruptcy Code, 84 Col L.J. 259, 261 (1979)
(claim is broadly defined to include any conceivable right excercisable against debtor which
could ever be reduced to a money judgment).
Commenting on the definition of claim under the Code, Representative Don Edwards
noted that with regard to § 101(4)(B) where "a judgment for specific performance may be
satisfied by an alternative right to payment, . . . the creditor entitled to specific perform-
ance would have a 'claim' for purposes of a proceeding ... ." 124 Cong. Rec. 32,393 (1978)
(emphasis added). However, Congressman Edwards explicitly stated that rights to an equi-
table remedy for breach of performance "[w]hich [do] ... not give rise to a right to pay-
ment are not 'claims' and would therefore not be susceptible to discharge in bankruptcy."
Id.
The Bankruptcy Law Commission took an expansive approach towards claims, describ-
ing a claim as a "legally enforcable demand for performance of an obligation to pay money."
See Bankruptcy Act of 1978: Hearings on 2266 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Judiciary,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 218 (1981); In re Southern Indus. Banking Corp., 46 Bankr. 306, 313
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985) (for equitable remedy to constitute claim under Code right to
payment must include right to be paid); In re Arker, 6 Bankr. 632, 635 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1980) (judgment rendered in state court.entitling creditor to payment of damages is claim
under Code); In re Kennise Diversified Corp., 34 Bankr. 237, 243 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(enforcement of compliance with housing laws not a money judgment therefore not claim
within meaning of Code).
'7 See In re Altair Airlines, 727 F.2d 88, 90 (3d Cir. 1984). The underlying right to
payment is determined by substantive local law. See In re Mandalay Shores Coop Ass'n, 54
Bankr. 632, 635 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984); In re Fantastik, Inc., 49 Bankr. 510, 512-13
(Bankr. D. Nev. 1985). See also, 3 COLLIER, supra note 1 § 502.02 at 502-24. Because the
Code does not define when a right to payment arises, see Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. 705, 709
(1985), reference is made to state law. See In re M. Frenvifle Co., 744 F.2d 332, 337 (3d. Cir.
1984), cert. denied 105 S. Ct. 911 (1985).
" See, Baird & Jackson, Kovacs and Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV.
1199, 1210-11 (1984). The proper focus of the "right to payment" inquiry is how non-bank-
ruptcy law would treat the right of an entity to use the debtor's assets to enforce the
"claim." Id. at 1205.
39 Appendix at 71, n.3, In re Robinson, 776 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S.
Ct. 1181 (1986). The bankruptcy court held that the discharge order discharged the poten-
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Conversely, upon imposition of Robinson's probation sentence,
COAP had no right to sue for the restitution obligation because
under the Connecticut Penal Code the state lacks authority to at-
tach the defendant's assets in the event of non-payment or proba-
tion violation.40 COAP's sole remedy in enforcing the court's order
to the "fullest extent possible" was to report a violation of
probation.41
It is suggested that the Second Circuit's conclusory observa-
tion that COAP sought to enforce payment of the restitution order
to the fullest extent possible is misleading. In fact, COAP sought
to enforce the state court's probation order to the fullest extent
possible42 and the implication that it had the ability to enforce the
tial civil claim by CDIM. see id. The court, however, did not consider the probation restitu-
tion order a debt to be discharged; thus distinguishing between the civil judgment and the
criminal conviction. See id; see also In re Berry, 3 Bankr. 430, 433 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1980)
(entry of restitution order in criminal proceeding did not preclude plaintiff from a civil pro-
ceeding to recover judgment for amount actually due). It would not have been necessary for
CDIM to have reduced its claim to judgment for the obligation to be dischargeable. See 11
U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982). The Code contemplates that all obligations of the debtor will be
treated at the bankruptcy hearing, "whether or not such right is reduced to judgment." Id.
See United States Dept. of Energy v. West Texas Mktg. Corp., 763 F.2d 1411, 1426 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1985) (to be allowed in bankruptcy a claim does not have to be first reduced
to judgment).
40 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53(a) - 32 (1985). The Connecticut Penal Code states that
upon violation of probation, the court may "continue or revoke the sentence of probation
• . . or modify or enlarge the conditions, and, if such sentence is revoked, require the de-
fendant to serve the sentence imposed or impose any lesser sentence." Id. No mention is
made of a right to seek the monetary payment of restitution obligations. See id.
Other states clearly preclude the attachment of assets in the event the debtor fails to
make restitution payments. Colorado, for example, which has mandatory restitution as a
condition of probation specifically addresses a defendant's failure to comply with the resti-
tution order, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-204.5 (1985), and the statutory scheme does not
allow the state to attach the debtor's assets nor does it allow the victim to enforce payment.
See In re Johnson, 32 Bankr. 614, 616 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983).
The Michigan Supreme Court, in analyzing restitutionary obligations, distinguished be-
tween civil and criminal obligations, People v. Good, 287 Mich. 110, 115, 282 N.W. 920, 923
(1938), stating that when restitution is imposed as a condition of probation no judgment is
rendered because no "writ of execution" can be issued to enforce collection of the restitutio-
nary obligation. Id. at 114-15, 282 N.W. at 923; see also People v. Heil, 79 Mich. App. 739,
748, 262 N.W.2d 895, 900 (1977) (probation statute does not create a substitute for an action
for civil damages, criminal and civil liability are not synonymous).
41 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53(a)-32(b) (1985).
4' Appendix at 60, In re Robinson, 776 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct.
1181 (1986). According to the bankruptcy court, COAP informed Robinson that it "intended
to enforce the [sentencing] court's order to the fullest extent possible. Id. (emphasis added).
This, of course, was COAP's function and responsibility as agent of the sentencing court -
to enforce probation. See Robinson, 776 F.2d at 38. However, the Second Circuit character-
ized COAP's action as seeking to "enforce the [restitution] order to the fullest extent possi-
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restitution order in a manner similar to CDIM's is incorrect.43
COAP's enforcement options under state law did not give the
agency any power to secure a money judgment."
It is submitted that the idea that no right to payment exists
within the meaning of the Code unless the creditor can sue for a
money judgment is in accord with the reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Kovacs.45 In Kovacs, an Ohio
state court issued an injunction requiring the debtor to clean up a
waste disposal site that violated state environmental laws.46 When
the debtor failed to comply, the state obtained the appointment of
a receiver, who was directed to take possession of the defendant's
property and other assets, and to implement the injunction.47 After
the debtor petitioned for bankruptcy, the state requested a ruling
that its cleanup order would not be dischargeable in bankruptcy. 8
ble." Id. at 32. (emphasis added). It is submitted that this characterization leads to funda-
mental flaws in its analysis of the case. See supra note 42 and infra notes 46 and 49 and
accompanying text (discussion of COAP's inability actually to enforce payment of the resti-
tutionary obligation).
43 See supra notes 39 and 40 and accompanying text. It is submitted that COAP pos-
sessed none of the rights ordinarily available to "creditors" under the Bankruptcy Code. See
11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1982). A creditor, for example, can file an involuntary petition under
chapter 7 forcing the debtor into bankruptcy, a right not available to COAP. The Code
defines a creditor as "[an] entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time
of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor." Id. at § 101(9) (1982). The Code,
however, specifically disallows all claims which are "unenforcable against the debtor and
.. . the property of the debtor." Id. at § 502(b)(1) (1982). The courts have generally recog-
nized that a right to sue for a judgment confers creditor status. See, e.g., In re Continental
Airlines Corp., 50 Bankr. 342, 353 (S.D. Texas 1985); In re Maine, 32 Bankr. 452, 453
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983) Those entities that fail to meet the requirements of the Code are
not permitted to share in the distribution of assets from the bankrupts estate. See In re
Underground Utility Constr. Co., 35 Bankr. 588, 589 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983) (to allow relax-
ation of bankruptcy rules reduces possible recovery for all other creditors; creditors meeting
all requirements of Code and Rules entitled to assume court will enforce rules in distribut-
ing debtor's estate); Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 U.C.LA L. Rv. 953, 958
(1981) (creditors lacking enforcable rights under state law have little chance of successfully
participating in bankruptcy proceeding); Baird & Jackson, supra note 38 at 1203.
4' See supra notes 40 and 42 and accompanying text; see also, Harland, Monetary
Remedies for the Victims of Crime: Assessing the Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L.
REv. 52, 102 (1982) (no judgment is made by restitution order, defendant merely given privi-
lege of avoiding usual penalty via restitution alternative.) Cf. In re Vik, 45 Bankr. 64, 67
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) (state did not possess a civil cause of action against debtor or his
property for collection of restitution obligation); but cf. In re Kayajanian, 27 Bankr. 711,
712 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983) (by signing promissory note for restitution obligation, debtor
substituted civil enforcement mechanism for criminal process).
45 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985).
4' See In re Kovacs, 29 Bankr. 816, 817 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
47 Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 706.
48 See id, at 706.
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The court determined, however, that contrary to its claims, the
state was seeking a money judgment and had the requisite enforce-
ment mechanism to obtain payment.49 The state, therefore, had
converted the cleanup order into a debt dischargeable in
bankruptcy. 50
Although the debtor in Robinson was obligated by the terms
of her probation to pay money, the fact that Connecticut law pro-
hibited enforcement of that obligation through control over Robin-
son's assets is what distinguishes that case from Kovacs.5 1 The
state sentencing court's only remedy upon Robinson's failure to
pay the restitution obligation was to modify the conditions of pro-
bation or require the defendant to serve the original sentence im-
posed.2 In Kovacs, however, "while the State claimed there was no
alternative right to payment, when the debtor failed to perform,
state law gave a state receiver total control over all Kovacs' as-
sets. ' 53 The Supreme Court emphasized that upon the debtor's
failure to comply with the injunction, the state sought only to en-
force a monetary payment, rather than to prosecute him for civil or
criminal contempt or for violation of state environmental law. 4
The Kovacs Court held that only this ability to seize assets under
state law converted the cleanup order "into an obligation to pay
money, an obligation that was dischargeable in bankruptcy. ' 55 In
its analysis of the "right to payment" in Robinson, however, the
Second Circuit did not view as relevant the fact that COAP's
"right to payment" lay only in the threat of revocation of proba-
tion rather than in the seizing of the debtor's property.56 It is sub-
mitted that the Second Circuit's view that a "right to payment"
4 See id. at 710-11.
:0 See id. at 708-709.
91 See supra note 40.
:2 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
I Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 710. The Supreme Court quoted the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals approvingly with regard to the right to payment concept: "[The state] does not
suggest that Kovacs is capable of personally cleaning up the environmental damage he may
have caused", [hence the state was seeking a monetary payment]. Id. (emphasis added)
quoting In re Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984, 987 (6th Cir. 1983).
" 105 S. Ct. at 710; see also, Note, Cleaning Up in Bankruptcy: Curbing Abuse of the
Federal Bankruptcy Code by Industrial Polluters, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 870, 876 (1985) (ap-
pointment of receiver to take possession of debtor's assets indicated that state wanted
money to defray clean up costs, and had converted clean up order into obligation to pay
money).
" Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 711.
" See Robinson, 776 F.2d at 38; supra note 33.
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exists where a state can merely threaten a debtor with revocation
of probation has been implicitly rejected in Kovacs where the Su-
preme Court held that a state order becomes a debt dischargeable
in bankruptcy only when the state can enforce the obligation by a
monetary payment. The Second Circuit's analysis in Robinson is,
therefore, incompatible with the standard enunciated by the Su-
preme Court in Kovacs.
IMPLICATIONS OF RESTITUTION AS "DEBT" FOR STATE
SENTENCING PROGRAMS
Inasmuch as Congress intended that a bankruptcy proceeding
not interfere with a pending criminal prosecution,5 7 the Robinson
Court's finding that Congress sanctioned interference with a resti-
tution sentence once the criminal proceeding had ended5 appears
anomalous. Such a holding seemingly encourages an offender to de-
lay filing for bankruptcy until the underlying criminal charge has
been adjudicated, thereby allowing him to circumvent the restitu-
tion sanctions imposed by the sentencing court.
Because the restitution obligation cannot be enforced by
seizure of assets, a holding that such an obligation is not a debt
frustrates no bankruptcy policy.5 9 It is suggested, however, that
holding such an obligation to be a debt frustrates the policy of
restitutionary probation as a rehabilitative measure available to
17 See supra note 35. See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) overld on other
grounds, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972) (intent of Congress to allow state courts to prosecute cases
in furtherance of criminal law); In re Holder, 26 Bankr. 789, 791 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn 1982)
(federal court should be cautious in interfering with state criminal proceedings); D. COWANS,
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, 278 (2d ed. 1977) (bankruptcy policy giving debtor fresh
start should not negate other significant policies).
58 See In re Robinson, 776 F.2d 30,37-38 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1181
(1986). But see In re Solar, Co., Inc., 44 Bankr. 828, 830 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984) (court
reluctant to interfere with state criminal proceeding absent extraordinary circumstances
where criminal proceeding had imposed restitution prior to debtor's commencement of
bankruptcy).
' See, e.g., In re HBG Servicecenter, Inc., 45 Bankr. 668, 673-74 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1985) (nothing in Code to imply Congress intended to curtail ability of sentencing courts to
impose condition of restitution for rehabilitative probation); In re Farrell, 43 Bankr. 115,
117 (Bankr. D. Tenn. 1984) (fresh start provision implies fresh financial start, not freedom
to violate criminal laws and escape prosecution). Restitution is an integral part of the proba-
tion sentence necessary for the protection of the public. See United States v. Brown, 744
F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Carson, 669 F.2d 216, 217 (5th Cir. 1982); In
re Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. 129, 133 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) see also, Note, Victim Restitution
in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REv. 931, 933 (restitution em-
ployed as punitive sanction throughout history).
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state courts. As a result of the debtor's ability to avoid the impact
of a restitution sentence, courts may decline to offer the restitution
alternative to the debtor, and instead impose a harsh jail term that
cannot be discharged in bankruptcy.60 Defining debt so as not to
encompass restitution obligations would avoid this potential nar-
rowing of sentence options available to state courts.
State courts have great latitude in dealing with the defend-
ant's failure to comply with the restitution order.6 1 Typically, a
number of options to restitution are considered before probation is
revoked.2 This latitude affords protection to defendants who are
sincerely unable to comply with the restitution order, while it pre-
serves the courts' power to impose a jail term on defendants who
willfully attempt to evade such an order.6 s
CONCLUSION
An examination of the language of the Bankruptcy Code, its
legislative history and decisional authority compels the conclusion
60 See, e.g., In re Vik, 45 Bankr. 64, 68 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984). As the Vik Court
observed:
If the commencement of bankruptcy and threat of discharge had loomed large as a
real and substantial possibility the state might well have chosen a different sen-
tencing option to serve its penal interest. It goes without saying that if the state
had opted for incarceration in lieu of probation and restitution that the debtor's
prison term would not have been vacated by the subsequent discharge of the [vic-
tim's] civil liability.
The result should not be different merely because the state chose a less re-
strictive means to further its penal goals .... [A] retroactive vacation of the
state criminal restitution order would significantly compromise the state's penal
decision. . . and potentially. . . discourage less restrictive sentencing options in
the future.
Id. at 68. It is submitted that the Robinson holding may encourage courts to impose a jail
sentence rather than restitution, and thereby harm debtors rather than help them.
"x See Harland, supra note 44 at 117-18. (common response to non-payment of restitu-
tion is to convert restitution obligation into number of hours of unpaid community service).
82 See Harland, supra note 44, at 114 n.349; see also, State v. Martinik, 1 Conn. App.
70, 71, 467 A.2d 1247, 1248 (Conn. App. 1983) (when probation is revoked, sentencing court
must examine reasons for failure to pay restitution).
11 See Harland, supra note 44 at 114. At the revocation hearing, the sentencing court
will be able to assess the reasons for non-compliance with the restitution order. See id. If
the debtor sincerely cannot comply with the order, the court can convert the obligation to
an order to perform community service. See id at 117-18. However, if the defendant willfully
fails to comply and the court views his initial acceptance of the restitution obligation as a
fraudulent misrepresentation, the court can vindicate its order by ordering the defendant's
incarceration. See Harland, supra note 44 at 114; State v. Martinik, 1 Conn. App. 70, 71,
467 A.2d 1247, 1248 (Conn. App. 1983) (upon willful failure to pay, court may revoke proba-
tion and sentence defendant to imprisonment).
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that state criminal sanctions imposing restitution do not create a
debt and therefore cannot be discharged in bankruptcy. Analysis
of restitution obligations focusing on the "right to payment" would
retain the viability of restitutionary probation as a rehabilitative
measure available to the sentencing court, and protect the integrity
of the state criminal justice system. Moreover, such an interpreta-
tion would comport with federal bankruptcy policies in ensuring
that the debtor is given a fresh "financial" start. It would exclude
legal obligations, designed to foster important state policies, which
do not impinge on that "fresh start." The interests of the state, the
bankruptcy system and the debtor can be served only if the courts
focus on giving the debtor owing criminal restitution a "fresh
start" and not a head start.
Siobhan E. Moran
